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RICHMOND MFDICAL CENTER FOR WOMEN V. GILMORE:
VIRGINIA PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION ACT'S CLARITY
EXTINGUISHES PHYSICIAN STANDING
LEE ANN LEZZER
A new provocative ad campaign will appear in Rolling Stone, People,
and college newspapers across the country.1 One such ad reads, "77%
of anti-abortion leaders are men, 100% of them will never be preg-
nant."2 Another focuses on symbols of the 1970s such as lava lamps
and platform shoes; the ad states, "Of all the things from the '70s to
make a comeback, there's one we really hate to see," [and the text is]
followed by a photo of a coat hanger.3 A final ad addresses abortion
from a legal stand-point asking, "When your right to a safe and legal
abortion is finally taken away, what are you going to do?" - the ques-
tion mark is a coat hanger.4 The ads were launched to arouse support
among choice supporters to oppose Capitol Hill efforts to curb abor-
tion.' Following the federal government's failed attempts to pass a
controversial "partial-birth abortion"6 ban bill, twenty-seven states, in-
cluding Virginia, have passed "partial-birth abortion" bans.7
1. See Paula Span, Choice Ads Target Young And Listless: Abortion Rights Activists Try An
Appeal to the Apolitical, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1998, at DI.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. The term partial-birth abortion is a legislative term used by anti-choice advocates.
See AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION, Stop Congress from Criminalizing Safe Abortion Procedures! (vis-
ited Jan. 22, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/reproduct/feature/html> [hereinafter
Stop Congress from Criminalizing Safe Abortion Procedures]. A "partial-birth abortion" ban
would "cover the vast majority of abortion procedures used after the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy." Id. "Partial-birth abortion" "is not a medical term; [r]ather, it is invented,
inflammatory terminology: a propaganda ploy intended to provoke legislators and the pub-
lic." Id.
7. See AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION, The State "Partial-Birth" Bills: Enjoined in the Courts
(visitedJan. 22, 1999) <http://www.alcu.org/issues/reproduct/statepbbans.html> [herein-
after State "Partial-Birth" Bills]. The states which have passed "partial-birth abortion" bans
include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id.
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Virginia's "partial-birth abortion" ban was challenged in Richmond
Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore.8 In Gilmore, the United States
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a stay on a district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the "par-
tial-birth abortion" ban.9 In the district court, a group of plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of the Virginia "partial-birth abor-
tion" ban statute; they claimed the statute was so broad and vaguely
worded that it would prohibit abortion methods they performed.1"
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and granted preliminary
injunctive relief because the "partial-birth abortion" statute's language
was so vague and the defendants were "unwilling to agree that" the
plaintiffs' abortion procedures were prohibited by the statute.11 Thus,
the district court found it necessary to prohibit the enforcement of
the Act until those issues could be resolved; 2 however, the court de-
clined to stay the preliminary injunction pending review by the Court
of Appeals.13
The defendants filed an application to stay the district court's
preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals pending appeal.14
The Court of Appeals granted the defendants' requested stay on the
preliminary injunction and held that the plaintiffs had failed to estab-
lish that the statute prohibited "the particular [abortion] procedures
that plaintiffs actually [did] perform."15 As a result, the Court of Ap-
peals found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not
have a reasonable fear of prosecution under the statute.1 6 The plain-
tiffs filed a motion requesting that the stay be vacated with a three-
judge panel of the Fourth Circuit. v The Commonwealth of Virginia
simultaneously appealed the merits of the lower court's preliminary
injunction. a8
This note examines Gilmore on four grounds and concludes that
the case was improperly decided by the Court of Appeals and threat-
8. 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998), revg 11 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Va. 1998).
9. See id. at 332.
10. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 799-800 (E.D.
Va. 1998), rev'd 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998) ("seeking a declaration that Chapters 448 and
579 of the 1998 Acts of the General Assembly, Va. Code §18.2-74.2 offend the Constitution
of the United States").
11. Id. at 829.
12. See id.
13. See Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 327.
14. See id.
15. Id. at 328.
16. See id.
17. See State "Partial-Birth" Bills, supra note 7.
18. See id.
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ens a woman's constitutionally protected liberty interest to choose
abortion as guaranteed by the United States Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Roe v. Wade.19 Gilmore allows a broad, legisla-
tively-coined term to ban the vast majority of abortion procedures
used after the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.2 ° First, the Court of
Appeals ignored contrary persuasive authority by concluding that the
Virginia physicians did not have standing to challenge the "partial-
birth abortion" ban statute.2" Second, the Court of Appeals improp-
erly concluded that the statute was unambiguous and therefore devi-
ated from the reasoning in other "partial-birth abortion" ban cases.22
Third, assurances from future prosecution by the defendants should
not have been weighed as heavily in the standing decision-making pro-
cess. 23 Finally, the decision is problematic on public policy grounds
because the decision could severely limit the ability of physicians to
bring claims on behalf of themselves and their patients and increase
health risks to women seeking abortions.24
I. THE CASE
A group of Virginia physicians, medical clinics, and non-profit
corporations offering reproductive health services, including abor-
tions, filed a civil rights action seeking a declaration that §18.2-74.2 of
the Virginia Code,25 which states, in part, "that a physician shall not
knowingly perform a partial birth abortion that is not necessary to
save the life of a mother,"26 violated the United States Constitution.
2 7
Particularly, the plaintiffs claimed that Virginia's Partial-Birth Abor-
tion Act violated a woman's right to privacy under the Due Process
19. 410 U.S. 113, 151-67 (1973) (holding that a woman can constitutionally choose
abortion with varying qualifications depending on the stage of her pregnancy).
20. See Stop Congress from Criminalizing Safe Abortion Procedures, supra note 6.
21. See id. See also infra notes 131-49 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 150-69 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 173-85 and accompanying text.
25. See VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-74.2(A) (Michie 1998) (describing the Partial Birth Abor-
tion Prohibited Act).
26. Id. The statute defines the term "partial-birth abortion" as "an abortion in which
the person performing the abortion deliberately and intentionally delivers a living fetus or
a substantial portion thereof into the vagina for the purpose of performing a procedure
the person knows will kill the fetus, performs the procedure, kills the fetus and completes
the delivery." VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-74.2(D) (Michie 1998).
27. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp' 2d 795, 799 (E.D. Va.
1998), rev'd 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998).
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,28 was void for vagueness, 29 and
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
30
First, the plaintiffs argued that the Act offended the
controlling [Constitutional] principles that: (i) the State
may not, before fetal viability, constitutionally impose an un-
due burden on a woman's decision to have an abortion; and
(ii) that '[a]n undue burden exists, and therefore a provi-
sion of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
before the fetus attains viability.'31
The plaintiffs contended that the Act violated the rule in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey which required an exception for maternal health
after viability.32 Second, the plaintiffs argued that the legislatively-
coined term "partial-birth abortion"3 used in §18.2-74.2(D)1 4 was so
broad and vague that it may have encompassed two key procedures
they currently performed legally.35 Finally, the plaintiffs contended
that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
36
The district court held that the medical clinics and physicians
had standing to challenge the statute since they intended to continue
28. See i& See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("Matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment."). Casey affirmed that "the reasoning in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), relate[s] to a woman's liberty because it involves personal decisions concerning not
only the meaning of procreation but also human responsibility and respect for it." Id. at
853. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
29. See Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 799. The void for vagueness doctrine provides that
criminal laws "must provide fair notice to persons before making their activity criminal and
also ... restrict the authority of police officers to arrest persons for a violation of the law."
JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §16.9 (5th ed. 1995).
30. See Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 799. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 ("No State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
31. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 801 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
32. See id. at 801 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 879) (holding that a "[s]tate may not pro-
hibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before
viability") (reaffirming the holding of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973), that "sub-
sequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life
may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment for the preservation of the life or health of the mother")).
33. See supra note 6.
34. VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-74.2 (D) (Michie 1998).
35. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 800 (E.D. Va.
1998), reu'd 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998).
36. See id. at 799.
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performing abortions, guaranteed under Roe v. Wade,37 that were ar-
guably prohibited and therefore prosecutable under the broad, vague
language of the state's "partial-birth abortion" statute .3 Next, the
court considered whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction.9
A preliminary injunction is warranted if a plaintiff satisfies each of the
four elements of a hardship balancing test:4" likelihood of irreparable
harm to the plaintiff if denied, likelihood of harm to defendant if
granted, likelihood of plaintiff success on the merits, and public
interest.41
In applying these factors, the district court first found that the
plaintiffs established an immediate irreparable harm because the stat-
ute would require the physicians, who had previously performed legal
abortions, "to alter their medical advice to, and their medical care of
their patients, contrary to their best professional judgment."4 2 Sec-
ond, the court found that the harm to the plaintiffs outweighed possi-
ble harm to the defendants because a woman's constitutional liberty
interest to terminate her pregnancy outweighs a State's interest in po-
tential life before viability.43 Third, the court found that the plaintiff
would likely succeed on the lack of maternal health exception claim.44
Finally, the court felt that the public interest favored a grant of a pre-
liminary injunction since the statute may have been unconstitutional
because it was so vague.45 Since the plaintiffs established the four fac-
tors of the hardship balancing test, the district court concluded that
the plaintiffs were entitled to preliminary injunctive relief on June 25,
1998.46
On June 29, 1998, the district court declined to stay its order
pending an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.47 In a single judge decision, the Court of Appeals
questioned the district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs faced a
reasonable fear of prosecution under section §18.2-74.2(D) and thus
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. See Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 805.
39. See id. at 806-19.
40. See id. at 806.
41. See id. (citing Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812
(1992) (citing LJ. By & Through Darr v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 120 (4th Cir. 1988) cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989))).
42. Id. at 809.
43. See id. at 810 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992)).
44. See id. at 823-27.
45. See id. at 829.
46. See id.
47. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326, 327 (4th Cir. 1998),
revu 11 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Va. 1998).
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had standing to challenge the provision.4" The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the plaintiffs had not established that the statute covered
their procedures and held that the physicians did not have standing to
challenge the statute.49
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress and the states have recently begun to introduce and
pass "partial-birth abortion" bans.5" Physicians and abortion providers
have continually challenged the various state "partial-birth abortion"
bans.5 Challenges to "partial-birth abortion" ban statutes often pres-
ent questions of standing.52 The recent "partial-birth abortion" ban
cases have generally held that physicians do have standing to chal-
lenge the statutes on constitutional grounds. 3
The "partial-birth abortion" ban movement began when the Na-
tional Right to Life Committee (NRLC) obtained a paper delivered by
an Ohio doctor at a 1992 National Abortion Federation meeting in
which he described an abortion procedure performed on patients
twenty to twenty-six weeks pregnant.54 Instead of limiting the abor-
tion ban to a medical procedure as described by the Ohio physician,
anti-choice advocates created the "partial-birth abortion" term for
political reasons. 55
In 1995, Congress introduced the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act 56 for the first time as an attempt to prohibit abortions in which
the physician "partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing
the fetus and completing the delivery." 57 Both houses of Congress
approved the Ban; however, President Clinton vetoed the legislation
on April 10, 1996 because the bill failed to include a provision al-
48. See id. at 327-32.
49. See id. at 332.
50. See H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. § 1531 (1995); H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § 1531 (1997);
supra note 7 (listing the 27 states that have introduced and passed "partial-birth abortion"
bans).
51. See generally State "Partial-Birth" Bills, supra note 7.
52. See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. For Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Va.
1998), rev'd 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich.
1997); Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507 (D. Neb. 1997); Planned Parenthood v.
Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997); Summit Med. Assocs. v. James, 984 F. Supp. 1404
(M.D. Ala. 1998).
53. See infra notes 88-109 and accompanying text.
54. See CONG. Q., Roe v. Wade at 25 (visited Jan. 21, 1999) <http://voter.cq.com/news/
roe19980121cqrl.html> [hereinafter Roe v. Wade at 25].
55. See id.
56. H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. § 1531 (1995).
57. Id.
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lowing "partial-birth abortions" to be performed when necessary to
protect the mother's health.
58
Constitutionally, an exception for maternal health is required in
all abortion regulations.59 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held
that although a state may regulate abortion in the second trimester,
the state "must regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are rea-
sonably related to maternal health."6" Moreover, in the third trimes-
ter, even though states can ban abortions, they must make exceptions
"where it is necessary . . . [to] preserv[e] the life or health of the
mother."6 1 The anti-choice movement specifically lobbied to leave
the word health out of the ban because health "has been construed by
the Court to mean 'psychological as well as physical well-being. '62
Although the House subsequently voted to cancel President Clinton's
veto on the "partial-birth abortion" ban, the Senate sustained the Pres-
ident's veto by nine votes.63
The legislature reintroduced the bill on "partial-birth abortions"
in February 1997,64 in response to announcements by a panel of the
American College of Obstetricians and the American Medical Associa-
tion that a "partial-birth abortion"-type procedure was not generally
the only means available to save the life of the mother.65 Moreover, in
the same year, "Ron Fitzsimmons, executive director of the National
Coalition of Abortion Providers, announced that he had lied about
58. See Kathleen A. Cassidy Goodman, Recent Development, The Mutation of Choice, 28 ST.
MARY's L.J. 635, 640-41 (1997).
59. See Roe v. Wade at 25, supra note 54.
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
61. Id. at 164-65.
62. Goodman, supra note 58, at 641 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92
(1973)).
63. See id. at 640.
64. See H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § 1531 (1997).
65. See Goodman, supra note 58, at 642. The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG), "while ultimately opposing the Ban, stated in January 1996 that it
could not identify any circumstances under which partial-birth abortions would be the only
option available to save the life or preserve the health of the mother." Id. Ironically, the
ACOG stated in January that these partial-birth-type abortions "may be the best or most
appropriate procedure in a particular circumstance to save the life or preserve the health
of a woman." Roe v. Wade at 25, supra note 54 (quoting AM. COLLEGE OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNECOLOGISTS, Statement (Jan. 12, 1999)).
In May 1997, the "American Medical Association (AMA) endorsed a ban on partial-
birth abortions, stating '[i]t is a procedure which is never the only appropriate proce-
dure.'" Goodman, supra note 58, at 642 (quoting Helen Dewar, AMA Blocks "Partial-Birth"
Abortion Curb: Endorsement of Legislation Comes as Senate Vote Nears, WASH. POST, May 20, 1997,
at Al). However, new evidence indicates that the AMA was so politically naive and con-
sumed by protecting the financial interests of doctors on Medicare issues that it ended up
supporting legislation that did not benefit the patient or protect the physician-patient rela-
tionship. See The A.M.A. 's 'Partial Birth' Fiasco, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1998, at Al.
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the number of partial-birth abortions performed nationwide on
healthy babies for non-therapeutic purposes."66 The President once
again vetoed the Act.6" If Congress reintroduces, or if Congress is
successful in overriding the presidential veto, the legislation could still
face a major obstacle with the United States Supreme Court.68 Judge
Richard G. Kopf of the Federal District Court for Nebraska believes
the statutes are likely to be unconstitutional because they are so vague;
"'One simply cannot ascertain from the legislative history precisely
what the Legislature wanted to ban. . . . We know the legislators
wanted to ban 'partial birth' abortions, but that term is unknown in
medical circles.' "69
Despite the possible constitutional problems with the federal
"partial-birth abortion" ban, many states have introduced similar
bans.7 ° Virginia based its "partial-birth abortion" ban statute on the
federal Act.7 ' In Virginia, the constitutional challenge of the state
"partial-birth abortion" ban statute revolved around the issue of
standing. 7
2
In order for a court to have jurisdiction, a "case or controversy"
must exist,7 3 and the plaintiffs must establish standing.74 The judicial
power given under Article III does not unconditionally authorize the
court to determine the constitutionality of legislative acts, 75 but rather
the Article III judicial power is a last resort for the determination of a
66. Goodman, supra note 58, at 642. However, "partial-birth abortion" ban opponents
claim that Fitzsimmons was merely speaking without statistical evidence. See Deborah
Sontag, Physicians Say 'Partial Birth' is Just One Way, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1997, at Al.
67. See Goodman, supra note 58, at 642.
68. See id. at 642-43. "Until the Supreme Court deals directly with partial-birth abor-
tion, nobody is going to know whether these laws are constitutional or not." Judges Block
Partial-Birth Abortion Bans, 28 MARkNATHA CHIUSTtAN J. 2440, 2 (visited Apr. 21, 1998)
<http://www.mcjonline.com/news/news2440.htm> (quoting Nik Nikas, attorney for
Americans United for Life).
69. Robert Pear, Inquiry Criticizes A.M.A. Backing of Abortion Procedure Ban, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 1998, at Al (quoting Judge Richard G. Kopf).
70. See supra note 7 (listing the 27 states that have introduced "partial-birth abortion"
bans).
71. See COMMONWEALTH VA., OFICE A-roRNEv GEN., Statement by Attorney General Mark
Earley (visited Jan. 21, 1999) <http://www.state.va.us/-oag/press/partial/htm>.
72. See generally Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D.
Va. 1998), rev'd 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998).
73. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases .. .and to
Controversies. . ").
74. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-78 (1992).
75. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982).
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real and vital controversy. v6 The district court never addressed
whether the plaintiffs' challenge in Gilmore was a "case or controversy;"
however, since the court immediately addressed standing,77 it likely
assumed a "case or controversy" existed.
Once the court determines that a "case or controversy" exists, the
plaintiff must establish standing.78 In order to establish standing, the
plaintiff must prove three elements. 79 First, the plaintiff must have
suffered an "injury in fact," an invasion of a concrete and actual or
imminent legally protected interest.8 0 Second, a causal connection
must exist between the injury and the conduct at issue such that the
injury is "'fairly ... trace [able] to the challenged action of the defend-
ant."'8 1 Third, it must be likely "that the injury will be 'redressed by a
favorable decision."'82 Each element requires separate analysis.
The "injury in fact" requirement for standing is generally at issue
in cases challenging "partial-birth abortion" ban statutes. When prov-
ing an "injury in fact," it is not necessary to wait for the threatened
injury to occur in order to obtain preventive relief.8" An impending
injury will satisfy the "injury in fact" requirement of standing.8 4 When
challenging the constitutionality of a criminal statute, plaintiffs do not
have to first "expose themselves to actual arrest or prosecution. 8 5 In
other words, even when a plaintiff alleges s/he will engage in conduct
allowed by the Constitution but forbidden by a statute, under which
s/he may be prosecuted, the plaintiff "should not be required to await
and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking re-
lief."86 In sum, to prove a credible threat of prosecution exists, a
plaintiff must prove that the threat is real and immediate and not im-
aginary, speculative, conjectural, or hypothetical.87
76. See id. (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345
(1892)).
77. See generally Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D.
Va. 1998), rev'd 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998).
78. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
79. See id. at 560-61.
80. Id. at 560.
81. Id. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
82. Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 43).
83. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 804 (E.D. Va.
1998), rev'd 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l
Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Va., 262 U.S. 553, 593
(1923))).
84. See id. (citing Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298 (quoting Pennsylvania, 262 U.S. at 593)).
85. Id. (citing Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298). See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459
(1974).
86. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. at 804 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973)).
87. See id. (citing Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298).
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Three of the most recent cases in which plaintiffs challenged
"partial-birth abortion" bans centered around physician standing to
challenge the statutes individually and on behalf of patients. For ex-
ample, in Evans v. Kelley,8" the court held, and the defendants did not
dispute, that the plaintiff physicians had standing to challenge Michi-
gan's "partial-birth abortion" ban statute on vagueness grounds be-
cause as providers of abortion they were subject to prosecution under
the statute.8 9 However, the Evans defendants did contest the physi-
cians' standing to challenge the ban on the grounds that it constituted
an undue burden to women seeking abortion,9 ° claiming that only
women seeking abortions covered under the statute had standing to
bring such a claim.91 The court found, based on U.S. Supreme Court
precedent, that doctors who perform abortions are entitled to assert
third-party standing for the rights of women seeking abortions.9" In
sum, the court held that the physician plaintiffs had individual stand-
ing to challenge the vagueness of the statute and third-party standing
to challenge the statute as an undue burden on behalf of their
patients.
A physician's standing to challenge a "partial-birth abortion" act
individually, and on behalf of her/his patients was also addressed in
Carhart v. Stenberg." In this case, the physician intended and pre-
ferred to use a method of abortion94 he feared was criminalized by the
act.95 Se eking a preliminary injunction, Dr. Carhart claimed he had
standing both to raise his own rights and the rights of his patients.96
First, he argued that the "partial-birth abortion" ban caused him to
subject his patients to a greater risk of injury or death by following the
statute instead of just performing a safe and effective abortion when
medically advisable.97 Since the statute prohibited the plaintiff from
performing an abortion method that he may deem safest for his pa-
tients, Dr. Carhart was subjecting his patients to an increased medical
88. 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
89. See id. at 1302-03.
90. See id. at 1302.
91. See id. Women seeking abortions would have standing to challenge the statute be-
cause states can impose restrictions on abortions before fetal viability as long as those re-
strictions do not impose an "undue burden" on the woman's ability to get an abortion. Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
92. See Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1302.
93. 972 F. Supp. 507 (D. Neb. 1997).
94. See id. at 514.
95. See id. at 520.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 525.
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risk; therefore, the court held that Dr. Carhart had individual stand-
ing to challenge the statute.9 8
Next, the court held that Dr. Carhart had the right to assert third-
party standing on behalf of his patients for two reasons.9 9 First, the
patient-doctor relationship is "fiduciary-like."' °  Secondly, women
seeking abortions often cannot challenge statutes on their own behalf
for they may fear a loss of privacy, and their claims may be mooted'
by the "time-sensitive problem of pregnancy."1 °2 Based on the fiduci-
ary nature of the relationship and womens' difficulties in bringing
their own claims, the court held that Dr. Carhart had standing to chal-
lenge the "partial-birth abortion" ban statute based on his own rights
and on the rights of his patients. 10 3
Individual and third-party standing for a physician to challenge a
"partial-birth abortion" ban statute was also addressed in Planned
Parenthood v. Woods.' 4 Similar to the Carhart1°5 decision, the Woods
court found individual and third-party standing for physicians to chal-
lenge the "partial-birth abortion" ban.' °6 First, the court held that the
physicians had individual standing to challenge the ban as unconstitu-
tionally vague. 107 Secondly, since the physician-patient relationship
was "fiduciary-like" and since women may be prevented from challeng-
ing the statute for privacy or mootness reasons, the court found stand-
ing for the physicians to challenge the statute on behalf of their
patients as an undue burden.'0° Thus, in Woods, the physician plain-
98. See id. at 520-21.
99. See id. at 520.
100. Id. at 521.
101. A claim is "moot" if "'there is no subject matter on which the judgment of the
court's order can operate.'" JOHN E. NowA & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§2.12(c) (5th ed. 1995) (quoting Ex parte Benz, 177 U.S. 378, 390 (1900)). Due to the
importance of some constitutional issues, the Supreme Court has been willing at times to
relax the mootness rule so that it will not prevent review. See id. In abortion cases, a
plaintiffs claim would not be initially moot, but it would become moot because the plain-
tiff would no longer be pregnant by the time of trial; therefore, the claim would lack a
subject matter upon which the court could rule. See id.
102. Carhart, 972 F. Supp. at 521.
103. See id. at 520.
104. 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997).
105. 972 F. Supp. at 520.
106. Woods, 982 F. Supp. at 1376-77.
107. See id. at 1376. The court then held that the ban was unconstitutionally vague be-
cause it did not give physicians fair warning as to the procedures it prohibited. See id. at
1379.
108. Id. at 1376. The court held that the "ban constituted an 'undue burden' on the
right to have an abortion because, in prohibiting the safest, most common methods of
abortion after the first trimester, the ban would force women from safer to riskier proce-
dures." State "Partial-Birth"Bills, supra note 7 (citing Woods, 982 F. Supp. at 1376-78). More-
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tiffs were found to have standing to challenge the statute individually
and on behalf of their patients. °9
Although, "partial-birth abortion" ban statutes have been passed
in twenty-seven states, al° many courts have found standing for physi-
cians to challenge the bans themselves and on behalf of their pa-
tients.' 11 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' finding of no standing
for the plaintiffs in Gilmore deviates from this trend.
III. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S REASONING
The first question facing the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit on the issue of standing was whether or not the
plaintiffs had proven "injury in fact.""' 2 The plaintiffs argued that they
suffered an "injury in fact" because they faced a reasonable fear of
prosecution under Virginia's "partial-birth abortion" ban statute.1 1 3
The court concluded that the statute was limited to prohibit one par-
ticular type of abortion procedure. 114 Moreover, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs had conceded, and the district court had deter-
mined, that the physicians did not perform the particular procedure
prohibited by the statute.' 15 Therefore, the Court of Appeals found
that the plaintiffs had no reasonable fear of prosecution under the
statute, and held the district court's finding of standing to be in
error."
16
However, the court reasoned that even if the statute could be
read to prohibit other methods of abortion, the district court should
have taken into account the defendants' assurances not to prosecute
the plaintiffs under the statute, rather than lightly dismissing them." 7
First, the Attorney General and the Commonwealth of Virginia had
"provided unequivocal assurances" that they did not interpret the stat-
ute to prohibit abortion methods the plaintiffs performed before the
over, the court explained that even if the statute did not ban procedures which physicians
may find to be the safest, the statute's lack of an exception for maternal health "[was]
another reason to find [it] unconstitutional." Woods, 982 F. Supp. at 1378.
109. See Woods, 982 F. Supp. at 1376-78.
110. See State "Partial-Birth" Bills, supra note 7.
111. See supra notes 88-109 and accompanying text.
112. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1998),
rev' 11 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Va. 1998).
113. See id.
114. See id. (claiming that "the plain language of the Virginia statute cannot reasonably
be read to prohibit the particular procedures the plaintiffs actually do perform").
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 330-31.
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statute was enacted.'" 8 Secondly, the defendants had maintained that
they would not enforce the statute against plaintiffs' performance of
such procedures." 9 Third, even if a physician began to perform an
abortion procedure that was legal under the "partial-birth abortion"
ban statute but incidentally became one that was banned by statute,
the defendants had maintained that the physician would not be prose-
cuted under the statute. 2 Although the district court rejected these
assurances, the Court of Appeals found them persuasive for two
reasons.
1 2
'
"First, by suggesting that the Commonwealth's officials [would]
yield to politics over law, the district court impute[d] a type of bad
faith, if not lawlessness, to the State's officials without either authority
or justification."' 22 Second, the district court's finding that these as-
surances could be abandoned by the same officials who promised
them when the winds of public opinion changed, ignored "the fact
that these statements were made under oath and with the knowledge
and imprimatur of the Governor of the Commonwealth.""12 Thus,
the Court of Appeals held that even if the "partial-birth abortion" ban
statute could be read to include plaintiffs' procedures, the district
court's finding of standing would still be in error because it did not
give the defendants' assurances the proper weight and authority they
deserved.12 4
Overall, the Court of Appeals claimed that the district court erred
by over-reading portions of the statute and finding ambiguity where
none existed.12 5 Moreover, the Court of Appeals maintained that the
district court had completely failed to consider those portions of the
statute that bore directly upon the plaintiffs' claims that the statute
was so broad and vague as to prohibit their abortion procedures. 126
Therefore, the Court of Appeals granted a stay on the district court's
injunction because the district court's finding of standing was in
error.
118. Id. at 330.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 331.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
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TV. ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals decision is problematic for four reasons.
First, it shows a deviation from the analysis of physician standing usu-
ally followed in "partial-birth abortion" ban cases. 127 Second, its con-
clusion that the "partial-birth abortion" ban statute was unambiguous
deviates from the reasoning of other "partial-birth abortion" ban
cases. 2' Third, it places too much weight on the assurances of the
defendants not to prosecute.1 29 Fourth, for public policy reasons, the
decision could threaten a woman's constitutional right to choose an
abortion under Roe v. Wade.
130
First, the decision deviates from the analysis of physician standing
in similar cases where "partial-birth abortion" ban statutes were chal-
lenged. Although not mandatory authority for the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, three other courts addressing "partial-birth abor-
tion" bans, Evans,1 3 1 Carhart,132 and Woods,131 found standing for phy-
sicians to bring vagueness claims on behalf of themselves, and undue
burden claims on behalf of their patients.' In Evans, the defendants
claimed that the physician plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
statute on undue burden grounds, arguing that only women seeking
abortions under the statute could assert an undue burden claim.
13 5
Moreover, in Evans, as well as in Woods,1" 6 the defendants did not dis-
pute that the physician plaintiffs had standing to raise a vagueness
challenge because they were subject to prosecution under the statute
as providers of abortion.137 The court found that the physicians suf-
fered a reasonable threat of prosecution because the statute was
"hopelessly ambiguous and not susceptible to a reasonable under-
standing of its meaning. "138
127. See infra notes 131-49 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 150-69 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 173-85 and accompanying text.
131. Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997). See supra notes 88-92 and
accompanying text.
132. Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507 (D. Neb. 1997). See supra notes 93-103 and
accompanying text.
133. Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997). See supra notes
104-09 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1302-03; Carhart, 972 F. Supp. at 520; Woods, 982 F.
Supp. at 1376.
135. See Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1302.
136. See Woods, 982 F. Supp. at 1376.
137. See Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1302.
138. Id. at 1311.
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In Gilmore, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the
"partial-birth abortion" ban statute to be unambiguous by finding that
only one procedure was banned.1"9 Since no reasonable fear of prose-
cution could exist under a statute that clearly does not prohibit the
procedures the plaintiffs performed, the Court of Appeals held that
the physicians lacked standing.14 ° With a statute as medically contro-
versial and vague as a "partial-birth abortion" ban statute,14 1 the Court
of Appeals should have found physician standing on the physicians'
vagueness claim for the reason stated by the courts in Evans and
Woods. As providers of abortions, they were subject to prosecution
under the statute.'
4 2
The Court of Appeals also could have granted the Gilmore physi-
cians standing because the statute limited their abilities to choose safe,
effective methods of abortion for their patients. For example, the
court in Carhart granted physician standing because the "partial-birth
abortion" ban at issue prohibited physicians from practicing medicine
in a safe and effective manner.143 Since the ban may have forced Dr.
Carhart to forego a particular procedure he may have believed was the
safest and most effective for a patient, his patients may have been sub-
jected to increased medical risk, and therefore, standing was war-
ranted.144 In Gilmore, the Court of Appeals held that the Virginia
"partial-birth abortion" ban statute prohibited one particular type of
procedure. 45 As a result of this finding, physicians' discretion to
choose the most medically appropriate abortion method for their pa-
tients will likely be denied.' 46 Therefore, as in Carhart,'4 7 standing was
warranted because physicians may be forced to subject their patients
to increased medical risk under "partial-birth abortion" bans.
In accordance with Carhart, Woods, and Evans, the district court
found standing in Gilmore because the possible ban on some of the
procedures plaintiffs performed would have prevented them from the
139. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326, 327-28 (4th Cir.
1998), rev'k 11 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Va. 1998).
140. See id. at 328.
141. See AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION, Bans on So-Called "Partial-Birth Abortions," (visited Jan.
25, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/library/pbabans.html> (quoting Evans, 977 F. Supp. at
1311) ("[Plhysicians 'simply cannot know with any degree of confidence' which proce-
dures the ban prohibits.") [hereinafter Bans on So-Called "Partial-Birth Abortions"].
142. See Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1302; Woods, 982 F. Supp. at 1376.
143. See Carhart, 972 F. Supp. at 520-21.
144. See id.
145. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1998),
revk 11 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Va. 1998).
146. See Bans on So-Called "Partial-Birth Abortions," supra note 141.
147. 972 F. Supp. at 520-21.
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safe practice of medicine.' 48 The result of the stay the Court of Ap-
peals granted will be to "chill... physicians' practice of medicine to
such an extent that [they will] be required to rely on procedures
which are medically less safe, or to refer patients out-of-state for the
method of abortion which is safest and in their best interests. '"49
In addition to deviating from the standing analysis generally used
in "partial-birth abortion" ban cases, the Court of Appeals decision
that the statute was unambiguous was also inappropriately premised
on the reasoning of only one "partial-birth abortion" ban case. In
Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 5' a group of physicians, on behalf of
themselves and their patients, filed suit challenging the constitutional-
ity of the 1997 Wisconsin "partial-birth abortion" ban statute' and
seeking a preliminary injunction.' 52 The Doyle court denied the plain-
tiffs' request for an injunction on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed
to establish that they were likely to succeed on the merits or that an
irreparable injury would result from an enforcement of the Act. 5 '
Specifically, the Doyle court did not find the statute to be vague' 54
or to include plaintiffs' procedures. 5 In examining the Virginia
"partial-birth abortion" ban statute for vagueness, the Court of Ap-
peals in Gilmore cited Doyle several times.' 56 However, the Court's reli-
ance on Doyle was misplaced because the Gilmore appeal focused on
the physicians' standing,'57 while standing in Doyle was merely as-
sumed. 5 ' In Gilmore, the Court of Appeals found that the plaintiffs
failed to establish the likelihood that the Virginia "partial-birth abor-
tion" ban statute applied to their abortion procedures and therefore
lacked standing to bring a claim of vagueness.' 59 In Doyle, on the
other hand, the court not only found that the statute was not vague,
but it charged the plaintiffs with creating the alleged vagueness as to
the meaning of the statute. 6 The Doyle court opined that the physi-
cians "feigned ignorance" because "the phrase 'partial-birth abortion'
148. See Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 807.
149. Id.
150. 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (W.D. Wis. 1998).
151. See id. at 1035 (discussing Wis. STAT. §§ 895.038 and 940.16 (1997)).
152. See id.
153. See id. at 1046.
154. See id. at 1040-45.
155. See id. at 1045-46.
156. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326, 328-30 (4th Cir.
1998), rev k 11 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Va. 1998).
157. See generally id.
158. See generally Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033.
159. See Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 332.
160. See Doyle, 9 F. Supp. at 1041.
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[was] understood in the medical community" to refer to a specific
procedure. 16' Thus, the Gilmore court inappropriately cited Doyle as
evidence that Virginia's "partial-birth abortion" ban was vague.
Gilmore can be further distinguished from Doyle because the deci-
sion in Doyle was based on the testimony of an expert doctor who testi-
fied that the Wisconsin statute proscribed plaintiffs' abortion
procedures as criminal. 1 62 In Gilmore, however, both the defendants'
counsel and experts were unwilling to concede that the Virginia stat-
ute banned a particular procedure.16 3 As a result, the district court
granted the preliminary injunction in part because the disagreement
between the plaintiffs and the defendants showed that the ban "[did]
not give 'a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contem-
plated conduct is forbidden by the statute.' ' 1 64 The district court
found that Virginia's statute was vague and stated, " [W] hen persons of
ordinary intelligence, including the defendants' own expert, are con-
fused as to the statute's meaning and differ as to the interpretation of
the Act, there is good reason to believe that, at law, the statute is un-
clear and ill-defined.
165
Since the experts in Gilmore could not agree to the procedures
prohibited by the ban, the Court of Appeals improperly cited Doyle as
evidence that a "partial-birth abortion" ban statute was not vague. In
Doyle, the experts agreed that the Wisconsin statute was vague.1 66 In
Gilmore, the experts did not agree on whether the statute was vague. 167
The vagueness problem rests on the fact that legislators are not
equipped to make medical decisions; therefore, they should not regu-
late medicine in a manner that undermines patient safety.1 61 "The
['partial-birth abortion'] bans' uncertain scope and use of non-medi-
cal terminology simply highlight that" decisions about the best surgi-
cal techniques for abortions should be made by doctors and not
politicians.169
The Court of Appeals decision placed too much weight on the
assurances of the defendants not to prosecute. The Court felt that the
161. Id.
162. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 819 (E.D. Va.
1998), rev'd 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998) (describing the testimony of Dr. Aultman in
Doyle).
163. See id.
164. Id. at 818 (citation omitted).
165. Id.
166. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
167. See Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 819.
168. See Bans on So-Called "Partial-Birth Abortions," supra note 141.
169. Id.
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district court should have given the defendants' assurances against
prosecution a sufficient amount of weight when considering the plain-
tiffs' vagueness claim because the defendants maintained that they did
not interpret the ban to include plaintiffs' abortion procedures.
1 70
Furthermore, the defendants maintained that they would not enforce
the statute against persons performing such procedures even if they
occurred incidentally.
17 1
Although the Court of Appeals would have relied heavily on the
defendants' sworn affidavits, the district court correctly found it im-
possible to give them much weight. A state cannot effectively protect
a physician against prosecution under a "partial-birth abortion" ban
statute when it is not clear what procedures are banned. Since the
defendants themselves were unable to agree whether or not the plain-
tiffs' procedures were excluded from the reach of the statute, their
sworn assurances could not accurately be said to protect the plaintiffs
and therefore should not have been given any weighted considera-
tion. Furthermore, it is possible that the defendants could have been
pressured and threatened by anti-choice advocates to start prosecut-
ing under the statute anyway. 172 Therefore, the only way to protect
women's rights to seek abortion is to grant physicians standing.
Finally, for public policy reasons, the Gilmore decision could
threaten a woman's constitutional right to choose an abortion under
Roe v. Wade. The "partial-birth abortion" ban issue is a surrogate for
the larger abortion debate.17 3 State "partial-birth abortion" ban stat-
utes thrust the horrible aspects of abortion in the face of the Ameri-
can public; anti-choice advocates hope this will encourage most
Americans, even those who thought they agreed with Roe, to support
the bans. 1
74
In nineteen of the twenty-seven states with "partial-birth abortion"
ban statutes, medical providers have challenged the bans "on grounds
that they endanger women's health, jeopardize safe medical practice,
and violate the constitutional rights of both patients and doctors."' 75
However, out of these nineteen challenges, seventeen of the "partial-
170. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 1998),
revu kI F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Va. 1998).
171. See id.
172. This is especially likely given that "partial-birth abortion" ban statutes were origi-
nally introduced as a result of anti-choice pressure.
173. Cf Roe v. Wade at 25, supra note 54 ("[T]he anti-abortion movement seized [the]
limited ban because public sentiment is strongly against the movement's broader goal of
outlawing abortions.").
174. See id.
175. Bans on So-Called "Partial-Birth Abortions," supra note 141.
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birth abortion" bans have been enjoined. 76 The Gilmore decision is
particularly problematic because it holds that a vague statute prohibit-
ing no known medical procedure is unambiguous and therefore con-
stitutional. Therefore, the Court of Appeals has allowed the state
legislators to assault reproductive freedom through the back door.
1 77
Since the Court of Appeals found that the statute was unambiguous,
it, in effect, opened the back door for legislators to attack abortion
one procedure at a time. The Court of Appeals decision was in error
given that the defendants' own experts could not even agree as to
what procedures the statute covered.
178
Gilmore also undermines a woman's right to seek an abortion be-
cause it severely limits the ability of physicians to bring claims on be-
half of themselves and their patients concerning the constitutionality
of abortion statutes in the future.' 79 By not allowing physicians stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of the "partial-birth abortion"
ban statute, the Court is essentially condoning vague legislation and
subjecting physicians to arbitrary enforcement under unclear stan-
dards. 18 ° Under these "partial-birth abortion" ban statutes which do
not describe any known medical procedure, physicians will be unable
to conclusively determine which procedures are prohibited.1 8 ' As a
result, they will likely fear prosecution and may stop performing
abortions.
Moreover, the Gilmore decision will unconstitutionally endanger
women's health and safety.182 Since "partial-birth abortion" bans pro-
hibit safe and common methods of abortion, they interfere with a phy-
sician's decision to select the type of abortion that is best for her/his
patient because s/he will be forced to rely on a method s/he is certain
will not violate the statute.' Furthermore, since "partial-birth abor-
tion" bans do not provide exceptions for maternal health, they are
176. See id.
177. See AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION, ACLU Asks VA Governor to Veto Abortion Ban, Promises
Legal Challenge if Bill Becomes Law (visited Jan. 25, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/news/
n032798a.html>.
178. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 813 (E.D. Va.
1998), rev'd 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998).
179. See Congressional Record: Don't Endanger a Woman's Health, (visited Jan. 24, 1999)
<http://www.policy.com/docs/cr/boxer091798.html> (providing Senator Barbara Boxer's
statement that "partial-birth abortion" bans silence physicians).
180. See Bans on So-Called "Partial-Birth Abortions," supra note 141.
181. See id. (claiming that "physicians appearing in courts all over the country have
testified that they read the language of the bans to reach most methods of abortion used
throughout pregnancy").
182. See id.
183. See id.
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unconstitutional' 8 4 and will "require women to remain pregnant even
in the face of serious health concerns."1 ' If standing for physicians to
challenge these bans is prohibited, many women will likely be refused
abortions that they have a constitutional right to obtain.
V. CONCLUSION
"Partial-birth abortion" bans are the newest issue encompassed
within the always controversial realm of abortion.18 6 The bans are also
a political "indicator of the direction the United States is moving" with
respect to a woman's choice.18 v The root of the problem is a politi-
cally-created, non-medical, vague term called "partial-birth abortion."
If the "partial-birth abortion" issue is to be resolved, physician
standing is key. Gilmore sets a precedent for future "partial-birth abor-
tion" cases that will allow courts to eradicate women's constitutional
right to abortion procedure by procedure. Although currently there
is more legislative than judicial activity on "partial-birth abortion," the
issue is probably going to arise in the judicial setting soon. In order
for resolution to occur, physicians must have standing to challenge
the bans so women's constitutional rights can be protected.
184. See id.
185. Id. (paraphrasing Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847, 860 (N.D. Ill. 1998)).
186. See id.
187. Goodman, supra note 58, at 661.
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